Abstract-In the midst of a social networking revolution, social media has become the new vehicle for effective business marketing and transactions. As social aspects to the Internet continue to expand in both quantity and scope, so has the security threat towards enterprise networks and systems. Many social networking users also become main targets of spams, phishing, stalking, and other malware attacks that exploit the trust among social network "friends". This paper presents a comprehensive method combining traditional security heuristics with social networking data to aid in the detection of malicious web content as it propagates through the user's network. A Facebook application is implemented to automatically evaluate and detect malicious link content. The results of testing this application against known phishing and malware sites with realworld user profiles have shown encouraging results.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
In recent years, the tremendous growth in both the size and popularity of social networking sites, such as MySpace (www.myspace.com) and Twitter (www.twitter.com), have allowed people all over the globe to virtually connect, communicate, and share their lives with one another [1] , [2] . Of the many examples of these sites, one of the most popular is Facebook -an online community of which at least 85% of college undergraduates in the United States are a part of [3] . In fact, since it was founded in 2004, Facebook's user base has grown to a staggering 400 million people from countries throughout the world [4] . Unfortunately, the proliferation of computer malware, such as viruses and phishing attacks, has also continued to rise in this same span of time [5] . As a result, malicious users and virus writers have found a natural progression between using traditional Internet technologies, such as web browsing and email, and exploiting the inherent trust and size of social networks to help spread their attacks [6] .
One of the most famous examples of this new breed of attacks is the Koobface virus, which has plagued users of both Facebook and MySpace. Essentially, the Koobface virus spreads through hyperlinks that appear to come from one of your friends, usually advertising a funny video. When the victim clicks the link to watch the video, they are met with a pop-up message stating that they need to update their Adobe Flash player. When the user clicks to download the "update", they are actually downloading a Trojan horse which installs both a web proxy and a backdoor on the victim's system. At this point, the virus masquerades as the victim and continues to replicate itself throughout the victim's social network [6] . The reason that the Koobface virus has been so successful in spreading is simply because of the inherent level of trust that users put into their use of social networks. Since the links appear to come from their friends, most users will click them and download the virus without ever stopping to consider the consequences of their actions.
In an attempt to combat this problem, computer security researchers have developed tools and techniques to help users identify and avoid malicious content. Static methods, such as blacklists, often have a tremendous success rate when it comes to identifying attacks, though they are often difficult to maintain due to the short lifespan of malware and phishing sites [7] , [8] , [9] , [5] . Dynamic detection methods avoid this problem by allowing the computer and/or browser to make a real-time decision about the site's intent based on attributes such as the server's geographic location, domain name, or offered content [7] , [10] , [11] , [9] , [5] . Yet, these methods are not without their own shortcomings as accuracy often becomes a concern. In addition, malware authors are able to design attacks that circumvent these analysis methods, thus rendering the tools essentially useless [7] .
While several projects have been successful in the area of malware and fraud detection, including examples such as CANTINA, Netcraft, and SpoofGuard, none to date have utilized the tremendous wealth of information found in social networks [7] , [12] , [9] , [5] .
In this paper, it is proposed to use social network information for malware and fraud detection. A Facebook application is created to utilize a person's social network to help make a more educated decision about the presence or lack of malicious intent in web content that they are exposed to.
Examples of the information that can be garnered from the Facebook databases that would be useful in this application are such statistics as the online identity of someone who sends you a link, the number of mutual friends you have with that sender, and the type of online interactions you have had with that person [13] . In addition, careful analysis of the data made available to a Facebook application can garner other useful information, such as how often a user tends to see messages from the sender. The underlying theory behind this approach is that a link that is sent to you by someone you talk often with, or have many mutual contacts with, is much less likely to be malicious than a link you receive from someone you rarely talk to or who is at the far reaches of your social network.
The inclusion of this information in malware detection techniques is a radically different approach than some of the more classic methods because it seeks to essentially customize the decision process to each individual user in the way that it uses personalized data as decision criteria. As a result, it should be much more difficult to bypass an application of this type because an attacker would first need to enter a user's social network and gain the trust of the victim, not to mention some of the victim's friends, in order to effectively fool the detection process. All of this must be done in a period of time that is short enough to avoid detection by the site's administrators or the victim, which would likely prompt an account lockout or password change.
B. The Facebook Environment
1) The Profile: When a user creates a Facebook account they are asked to setup their profile page, which will contain all of the information they want to present about themselves to other users. The user's profile often contains some basic information, such as name, gender, hometown, and contact details. Fig. 1 demonstrates an example of a Facebook profile. 2) The Wall: A user's wall is a place for their friends to send publicly-viewable messages directly to the user. Unlike a status message, wall posts tend to be more targeted at the Wall's owner. The Wall will also contain a brief "recent activity" section that summarizes updates to the user's profile and their latest actions on the site. Fig. 2 illustrates an example of a Facebook wall. 3) The News Feed: Like the Wall, the user's News Feed, or stream as it is called in the Facebook API documentation, is a collection of messages, status updates, and shared media posted by others in the user's social network. However, unlike the Wall, which is comprised of messages all directed at the user, the News Feed is an aggregation of content from all of the user's friends. For example, if Bob were to post a status message with a link to a funny video he is watching, this would not show up on Alice's wall. It would, however, be eligible to show up in Alice's News Feed along with all of the other news from her friends. Depending on a user's privacy settings, wall posts between mutual friends may also show up in a user's News Feed.
4) Applications:
Through the Facebook API, an application can access most areas of the site, including user profiles and News Feeds, with the same permissions as the user who is running it. This allows users to post status updates and access information from their friends through individual applications. Since the release of the Facebook API, applications of every conceivable function, useful or otherwise, have been created to run inside the Facebook environment. Examples of some popular Facebook applications include Music, which allows users to post songs to their profiles that can be streamed by others, Astrology Daily, which updates the user's status with a daily horoscope based on their birth date, and Farmville, a farm simulation game similar to the SimCity series that includes social networking aspects to the gameplay.
When a user chooses to run a given application, it is "installed" to their profile by becoming associated with their Facebook account after it is manually approved. Once this is complete, the application is able to execute within the context of the user's profile and perform whatever functionality it has been designed for.
In a small number of cases, users must explicitly opt-in to certain application functions by approving requests for special permissions. Some of these special permissions include the ability to update the user's status, the ability to send email to the user, and the ability to upload videos and photos to the user's profile [15] . Unfortunately, beyond these standard and relatively nondescript opt-in screens, the user has no further insight into what the application is designed to do except for what the developer chooses to reveal in its description. This presents a very real security concern for users of Facebook.
II. THE FACEBOOK APPLICATION SYSTEM
The proposed system to detect malicious links takes advantages of multiple social network information. The overall process flow is illustrated in Fig. 3 
Fig. 3. Process Modules
A. Facebook Heuristics
In this module, the credibility of a message sender is evaluated based on the association between the message sender and the user. There is various information in Facebook that can be utilized to characterize the credibility of the sender. If the sender is a friend of the user, or the sender has mutual friends with the user [14] , or the user is attending or has attended any events with the sender, the sender is unlikely malicious. If the user is tagged in any photos with the sender, the sender is credible, because the user does not appear in pictures with malicious users. If the user reads posts by the sender often, it indicates the user knows the sender, hence the sender is not malicious. Finally, if the sender is in the user's trusted friend list, the sender is not malicious. Based on these heuristics, a score is calculated to represent the overall credibility value of the sender. Functions and their return values that collect social network information are illustrated in Fig. 4 . Notice that the constants $GOOD SCORE, $BAD SCORE, and $NO SCORE are configurable, and they were set at 1, -1 and 0, respectively, in this experiment.
B. Traditional Heuristics
In this module, the following heuristics are applied to verify the validity of a URL link. 1) Server Location Check the geographic location of the web server. Web server from some locations have a high probability to be malicious than those from other locations [15] , [9] .
2) Domain Age Newly registered domain names have a high probability to be malicious than those registered for a long time [7] , [5] .
3) Suspicious Characters
An URL containing some characters such as "@" or many (> 1) "-" has a high probability to be malicious according to [7] , [5] .
4) Non Standard Ports
According to [9] , a website being hosted on a nonstandard port is more likely to be malicious. Nonstandard ports are considered to be anything other than TCP/80 or TCP/443. 5) Number of subdomains A URL that has many subdomains (> 3) has a high probability to be malicious. Few malicious sites will take the time to setup an SSL version of their site. In addition, this test considers a site built with SSL as more secure. Based o n research by [7] .
These functions and their return values are illustrated in Fig. 5 .
C. Google Safe Browsing
Checks the URL hash against the Google Safe Browsing databases (both blacklist and malware) to see if the site is known to be malicious. If the URL exits in either the blacklist or malware list, the score for the link will be $BAD SCORE*100, which penalizes the link severely; otherwise, just return $GOOD SCORE.
D. Twitter Heuristics
Searches Twitter for the full URL and, if it is not found, the domain used in the URL to see if it is being shared there. The theory is that popular links and well-known domains should appear in Twitter search results. Malicious or obscure sites should not appear in Twitter search results as Twitter just started to filter malicious URLs [16] . If the full link appears on Twitter, the check function returns $GOOD SCORE*2, else if the domain used in the link appears on Twitter, the function returns $GOOD SCORE; otherwise, the function returns $BAD SCORE. 
III. THE APPLICATION TESTING
Once the application was built, testing began by volunteers who approved the application for use on their profiles and ran the automatic scan on their News Feeds several times. During the testing, 377 individuals were reached, only 22 took the time to participate in the study. In order to provide an effortless testing process, the application is split into two main functional components: the automated scan and the manual scan.
A. Automated Scans
The automated scan is the main real-world data collection component of the application. It is also the first feature that a user will access when they add the application to their Facebook profile. Once the user approves the application's basic functionality and grants proper permissions, the automatic scan starts to search the user's friend's list and collect information from the user's News Feed, such as any links that are found in the news feed. The scan report will include each of the links that were discovered, their scores for each test that was run, and a final aggregated score for each link.
B. Manual Scans
The manual scan is designed to allow researchers and users to test links which were discovered outside of their Facebook News Feed, without requiring that they post them publicly. Links are collected manually, but then passed to the scanner and tested using the same scripts as the automated scan, which means that the results should be comparable to that of the automated scan.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The application was developed and tested on a 1.6 GHz AMD Athlon XP 2000+ PC with 256 MB of RAM. Software used and their versions are listed in Table I. For the manual tests, the data set of 100 links was selected. Half of them are malicious, the other half are not. These 100 URLs were then tested against profiles of four different Facebook users who had also participated in the automated scan testing. The first test consisted of 50 links (25 safe, 25 malicious) and asked users to choose a random friend in their trusted list as the sender. The second test with the remaining 50 links was performed with a user not in their trusted list chosen as the sender. In total, this resulted in 400 data points, which are briefly summarized in Table II . After further examination of scores of these test cases, a threshold value of 2.5 is chosen to separate malicious and non-malicious URL links. And the performance of the application is summarized in Table III . In order to fully understand whether or not the use of social networking data is successful in helping to predict the presence of malicious content in URLs, the scores from all social networking-related tests can be removed and the success/failure rates can be re-calculated. The high-level summary of data for the recalculated scores is described in Table IV. With the threshold value set at 4.5, the performance of detection without social networking data is illustrated in Table V. Based on the comparison of the success and failure indicators described in Tables III and V , it is unreasonable to make an assumption about the effectiveness of the use of social networking data in malicious URL prediction for this sample size, given that the values are so close. However, the results do indicate that there is potential for this method to be improved upon to the point where it does become effective. As the data shows, the use of social networking data allowed the application to identify an additional seven URLs that were malicious that would not have been detected otherwise. While the social networking data did induce a false positive for one additional URL, this behavior could likely be resolved through more appropriate score weighting. Ultimately, a larger sample size would need to be obtained to determine if these results are statistically significant, or even typical. However, it is clear, given the slight increase in effectiveness, that this application and its methods should be studied further.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This research has shown that it is in fact possible to detect malicious web content with the help of heuristics based on social networking data. The success rates for the tests performed with this proof-of-concept application certainly do not rival the real-world success rates achieved by researchers such as Fette et al. [10] or Zhang et al. [5] . However, this research was able to exceed the 34% success rate for detecting legitimate content achieved by Boykin and Roychowdhury in their study of using social networks to predict the presence of spam in email by a factor of 35.5%, since it correctly identified 69.5% of safe URLs. In addition, the study's 56% success rate for detecting unwanted content is extremely close to this research's 55.5% for detecting malicious URLs [5] . This is an encouraging result as future studies will likely be able to improve this proof-of-concept application and bring its effectiveness to a point that is reliable enough for use in real-world environments.
Although the application was purposely developed as a proof-of-concept, it is usable as-is by anyone with a Facebook account. Still, there are many ways in which this application can be improved upon that will benefit its functionality, performance, and effectiveness. In particular, machine learning can be applied to classify malicious and non malicious URLs in the future.
